See full version: Life Jacket Test
The Zhik buoyancy aid ($119.00) was the staff favorite in the dinghy sailing category because of its overall fit and comfort. It was easy to put on and fit well without riding up when in the water. The Zhik was also the least bulky of the jackets and was easy to swim in, making it the "Staff Pick" of this category. This is perhaps because it had more room in the shoulders than some of the other jackets. here
Coast Guard statistics show that anglers are particularly vulnerable as they often boat alone and in cold weather. A few lifejackets sit side by side.For this reason, the BoatUS Foundation has worked closely with the angling community on boating safety for over a decade. Among the excuses given by anglers for not wearing a life jacket is they get in the way of casting a rod. Manufacturers of life jackets have attempted to address these concerns by repositioning flotation in these active wear life jackets and making them more multi-functional. [links]
Watersports participants typically play hard and fall harder. Because of this, they demand a life jacket that moves with their body, protects them upon impact with the water, and offers some degree of flotation. In the United States, the typical life jacket for this type of activity is a Coast Guard-approved Type III life jacket. The Coast Guard label on the inside of the jacket will typically specify if a life jacket is intended for this activity. here
The Baltic Fisherman ($90.07), Stearns Sport Vest ($35.71) and Onyx Classic Fishing Vest ($49.99) are all constructed with inherently buoyant material. Each vest features adjustable belts, large armholes and pockets for small gear. The Baltic was longer in the waist than the others and was noticeably heavier than the others when exiting the water. The Stearns and the Onyx had large drain holes or mesh to help alleviate this issue.
The favorite in this group and our “Staff Pick” was the Onyx, available at West Marine. It edged out the Stearns slightly because the straps prevented the vest from riding up or shifting. The back of the vest also has some flotation that was designed to ride up slightly to keep the neck and head positioned up when treading water, which made our testers feel more secure. The price of the Onyx was also reasonable, especially when you consider it is a fishing vest and life jacket in one.
Additional Information:
Must be worn to meet federal requirements.
Intended Use:
For boating inshore and near shore and for supervised activities such as sailing regattas, dinghy races, canoeing. here
NOTE - Type IV devices must be IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE for use. You must have one at arm's length to throw over the side in an emergency. Having one in a locker under the driver's seat isn't considered "immediately available." [links]
Minimum Buoyancy:
34 lbs. for adult size.
Offers the best protection, but is somewhat bulky and uncomfortable. Does the best job of retaining body heat, as it has additional foam and fabric, and keeps your head higher above water.
Minimum Buoyancy:
15.5 lbs. for adult size. more
Dr. Quinn has raised a variety of antitrust claims in his complaint. He alleges that the Hospital's refusal to admit him to active staff privileges constitutes a group boycott and a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and an unlawful monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. more
As for the argument that the Hospital's alleged monopoly of hospital facilities in the area transforms its decision into state action, this argument was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, 419 U.S. at 351-52, 95 S.Ct. at 453-54. Dr. Quinn also maintains that the Hospital's reliance on a federal regulation governing the conditions under which hospitals may receive federal aid to justify its decision shows that the state action requirement has been met. It is well established, however, that "[s]ection 1983 provides no cause of action against federal officers or private individuals acting under color of federal law." Betlyon v. Shy, 573 F.Supp. 1402, 1407 (D.Del.1983). See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423-25, 93 S.Ct. 602, 605-07, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973); Campbell v. Amax Coal Co., 610 F.2d 701, 702 (10th Cir.1979); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1164 (3d Cir.1971).
This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court cases that have found a basis for the state action exemption. For example, in Parker itself the state policy at issue was a scheme for marketing raisins, one that clearly intended to "restrict competition among the growers and maintain prices in the distribution of their commodities to packers." Id. at 346. Similarly, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., supra, the court held that a municipality's provision of electric utility service on a monopoly basis could be exempt under Parker if the municipality's conduct was authorized by the state, and in New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 99 S.Ct. 403, 58 L.Ed.2d 361 (1978), the court declared the Board's regulation of new automobile dealerships exempt under Parker on the ground that the California "Automobile Franchise Act's regulatory scheme is a system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships." Id. at 109, 99 S.Ct. at 412. Likewise, in the two state action cases decided during the past term, the Supreme Court declared anticompetitive conduct exempt where the state had evinced a clear intention of displacing competition with regulation. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, supra, (municipality's monopolization of sewage treatment facilities undertaken pursuant to state policy); Southern Motor Carriers' Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, supra, (private motor carriers' collective rate setting authorized by state regulatory schemes). here
for purposes of section 1983. The Third Circuit disagreed and stated that "the receipt of Hill-Burton construction funding, Medicare and Medicaid funds, and the existence of tax exemption, as well as state licensing requirements for non-profit hospitals, do not constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 564. Accord Holton v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 419 F.Supp. 334 (E.D.Pa.1976), vacated on other grounds, 560 F.2d 575 (3d Cir.1977); Sament v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hospital, 413 F.Supp. 434 (E.D.Pa.1976); Acosta v. Tyrone Hospital, 410 F.Supp. 1275 (W.D.Pa.1976). Thus, Dr. Quinn's argument that Kent General Hospital's decision not to admit him to active staff privileges was state action because the Hospital is dedicated to a public use, is subject to state regulation and receives tax benefits and public funding is contradicted by the applicable cases in the Third Circuit. 5
Although the qualified privilege will generally attach to a communication involving the character or qualifications of the employee, the employer will lose the benefit of this privilege if the employer abuses it. Id. at 479. Abuse of the privilege can occur when the statements are made "with an improper motive" or when the statements are made with actual malice. Id. at 480. Loss of the privilege by reason of an improper motive occurs with "excessive or improper publication, by the use of the occasion for a purpose not embraced within the privilege, or by the making of a statement which the speaker knows is false." Id. at 479. Loss of the privilege by actual malice occurs when the statement is made "with actual ill will toward the object of the statement." Id. at 480; see also Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d at 291 ("[a]bsent a finding of express malice, the privilege, if not abused, defeats the action"). To show express malice, the plaintiff must show "that the statements were made primarily to further interests other than those protected by the qualified privilege and that the chief motive . was the defendant's ill will." Id. Furthermore, "the mere addition of the fact that a defendant feels indignation toward plaintiff and enjoys making such statements" does not constitute actual malice. Id. The question of whether or not the employer has lost the benefit of the privilege is a factual question for the jury, Burr v. Atlantic Aviation Corp., 348 A.2d 179, 181 (Del.1975); Pierce v. Burns, 185 A.2d at 480, and the plaintiff has the burden to establish abuse of the privilege, Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d at 291. more
According to the Restatement, the state of the location of publication supplies the substantive law governing a defamation action, unless some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties that the state in which publication occurred. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 149. Whether a state other than [links]
Lastly, plaintiff asserts defendants are chargeable for defamation stemming from plaintiff's own publication of statements originally made by Klima. D.I. 45 at 13. This theory of recovery, termed "compelled self-publication," rejects the traditional mantra that a plaintiff cannot recover for his own publication of defamatory statements reasoning that, at least in the employment context, the defendant knew plaintiff would be compelled to repeat the defamatory statements to prospective future employers. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 886-88 (Minn.1986). The Court will address each of plaintiff's recovery theories in turn. [links]
Whatever the merits of plaintiff's compelled self-publication theory, the Court need not predict whether the Supreme Court of Delaware would recognize compelled self-publication as the law of Delaware. Assuming, without deciding, that plaintiff has met his summary judgment burden to show publication of a defamatory statement, the Court will grant defendants' motion because Delaware's qualified privilege would apply to the facts of this case as developed on the record and would protect Klima's statements to the plaintiff. See also Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn.1986) ("the logic of imposing liability upon a former employer in a self-publication case appears to compel recognition of a qualified privilege"); Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 15.02(3)(c) at 15-13 (release no. 7, 1994). For example, Klima and plaintiff had a common interest in communications concerning plaintiff's job performance, and plaintiff had a legitimate interest in learning of the reasons for his termination. Communications of this sort lie at the core of qualified privilege in Delaware and should be protected just as a qualified privilege would protect Klima's statements if he had initially communicated them to plaintiff's prospective employers. Cf. Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286, 291 (Del.Super.Ct.1982) (holding internal corporate communications concerning employee terminations protected by the qualified privilege). The Court holds that defendants have met their burden to show that a qualified privilege attaches to Klima's statements to plaintiff. Furthermore, because plaintiff has not put forth any record evidence demonstrating that Klima's statements were made to further interests other than the qualified privilege, that Klima's chief motive in making the statements was ill will towards plaintiff, or that Klima's statements were false, see D.I. 48 at 4 (arguing, without pointing to evidentiary material, that Klima's statements were false), the Court will grant defendants motion in regard to plaintiff's compelled self-publication theory.
the nonmovant's burden of proof at trial." Id. In other words, the moving party is not required to negate the nonmovant's claim, but instead must only point out the lack of evidence supporting the nonmovant's claim. Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership Composed of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir.1991). In contrast, when the moving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party must point to evidence in the record that supports the movant's version of all material facts and demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. National State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir.1992). If the moving party does not meet this standard, the court must deny the motion for summary judgment, even if the nonmoving party does not present opposing evidentiary materials. Id.