However, it has certain drawbacks, at least to the person who wishes to claim maximum autonomy. Inasmuch as it is specified, it tends to be subject to various conditions, either explicit in the legal right itself or implied by the larger web of the society’s laws. The right to liberty, for instance, does not apply to those who have committed a crime and may lawfully be incarcerated; the right to property does not mean you can do just anything that you might want to do with your property. And inasmuch as the right is guaranteed by a particular government, it seems to be limited in time and place: In 1791, you would not have had rights to “free speech” and “free exercise of religion” if you’d lived in most places outside America. The language of natural rights is an attempt to transcend these limits. It asserts rights that are unconditional and universal, binding always and everywhere. But it expects somehow at the same time that these boundless rights, granted by nobody to everyone, will nonetheless enjoy the stability and security that attach to legal rights. As Biggar shows with great patience and care, this is simply impossible. more